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JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR. 
§ll.l. Due process: Judicial review. A year ago there was noted 
in these pages an incipient judicial disposition to tighten constitu-
tional check reins upon the legislature when it acts in the area of 
economic regulation. In one easel it was indicated that there must 
be an affirmative showing that legislation is "for the good and welfare 
of this commonwealth" (not merely, as the Constitution recites, that 
it is such "as [the General Court] shall judge" to be for such good 
and welfare). In another case,2 while the legislation before the Court 
was sustained, it was indicated that if the legislative end could have 
been attained in a way less restrictive of individual free enterprise 
the alternative method of regulation must be chosen. 
In the 1964-1965 year this judicial attitude became more pro-
nounced, and there can be seen to be developing a reversion toward 
identification of constitutional due process with laissez faire eco-
nomics, and a blurring of distinction between review of the legis-
lature's power and review of the wisdom of its enactment. 
Coffee-Rich is a liquid substance, with a vegetable fat base, designed 
to whiten coffee as cream does. It contains no milk fat, and the con-
tainers in which it is offered for sale in retail food stores are im-
printed with the legend "A VEGETABLE PRODUCT - CON-
TAINS NO MILK OR MILK FAT." When poured into coffee, it 
produces the same color and taste as does cream so poured. The 
Director of the Division of Food and Drugs of the State Department 
of Public Health gave notice that he proposed to treat the product 
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR., is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a 
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§11.1. I Paddock. v. Town of Brookline, 847 Mas.s. 61, 197 N.E.2d 321 (1964), noted 
in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.1. 
2 Aeration Processes, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Health, 846 Mass. 546, 194 
N.E.2d 838 (1963), noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1l.5, at 130-131. 
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as "misbranded," i.e., "in imitation or semblance of any other food" 
for which a statutory standard was established.s There is a statutory 
standard for cream.' "Misbranded" foods are subject to embargo, and 
dealers in them are subject to criminal sanctions.1> Coffee-Rich has 
caloric content, although not as much as does cream, and is safe for 
human consumption. It is displayed and sold from the "frozen food" 
sections of retail establishments, and cream and milk are not ordinarily 
sold from such sections. 
These were the agreed facts in Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner 
of Public Health,6 a suit by the manufacturer for an injunction for-
bidding enforcement of the "misbranding" statute against the plain-
tiff. The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the product was "in imi-
tation or semblance" of cream, within the meaning of the statute, but 
it ordered the relief requested on the ground that the statute, as 
applied to the product, was unconstitutional. 
The statute, as the Court had held only shortly before,7 is a proper 
police regulation because it is designed to prevent consumer con-
fusion. But, the Court ruled, the danger of consumer corrfusion in 
the present context is so minimal that prohibition of the sale of an 
intrinsically wholesome product cannot be reconciled with the consti-
tutional provisions in favor of individual rights. 
The Court conceded that application of the statute to the plaintiff 
would be compatible with the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
of Law in the light of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in comparable cases.S It went on, however, to point out that, 
"[t]he Constitution of a State may guard more jealously the exercise 
of the State's police power."9 This, of course, is a familiar proposition. 
What it means in the concrete can be a puzzling question. 
The Court suggested the use of a formula not unlike the criterion 
of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, viz., whether the regu-
lation is "a reasonable means of realizing this [legislative] purpose."10 
The Court found the question answerable in the negative because, 
in the circumstances of the case (content of advertising and container 
label, and sales location), "We do not believe that an average con-
sumer would buy this product under the mistaken impression that it 
is milk or cream."l1 Does this mean that, if the legislature was of 
opinion that the labeling and other factors were not a sufficient assur-
ance that there would be no consumer confusion, its judgment was 
a C.L., c. 94, §187. 
4Id. §12. 
5Id. §§189A, 191. 
6 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 155, 204 N.E.2d 281. 
7 Aeration Processes, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Health, 346 Mass. 546, 194 
N.E.2d 838 (1963), 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.5. 
S 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 155, 161, 204 N.E.2d 281, 286. 
9 Ibid. 
10Id. at 163, 204 N.E.2d at 287. 
11 Id. at 164, 204 N.E.2d at 288. 
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unsupportable as a matter of inference from observable facts? Or, 
does advertence to the "average" consumer reflect a judicial judgment 
that the individual freedom of the manufacturer of a nutritious food 
product is too high in a scale of social values to be taken away because 
of a rather remote danger of public disadvantage? 
That the latter question may describe the mental processes of the 
Court in dealing with questions of constitutional limitations upon the 
police power was indicated within a week after the decision in 
Coffee-Rich. 
The narrow issue in Milligan v. Board of Registration in Phar-
macy12 was whether action of the Board upon an application for a 
permit to conduct a retail drugstore is an "adjudicatory proceeding" 
within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act so as to be 
reviewable under the Act.13 This turned upon the question whether 
the proceeding before the Board was one in which the rights, duties 
or privileges of the applicant "are required by constitutional right 
or by any provision of the General Laws to be determined after oppor-
tunity for an agency hearing."14 The licensing statute did not ex-
pressly provide for hearings on permit applications, and the Court 
(not mentioning the traditional canon that constitutional issues will 
not be resolved if the case can be decided on lesser grounds) did not 
reach the question whether a hearing was required by implication of 
the statute. It was concluded that opportunity for hearing is consti-
tutionally necessary. 
The result could have been, and to some extent probably was, 
reached by something like the following reasoning: Entitlement to a 
permit is established when the applicant and his premises meet ob-
jective statutory standards.15 Elementary decency and fairness (pro-
cedural due process) demand that, before it is officially determined 
that the standards have not been met, the applicant shall have oppor-
tunity to prove that they have been met, and to know and refute any 
information which might lead to a contrary conclusion. This means 
that he must be given the opportunity to have a "hearing" of some 
sort. That, in essence, is what was decided by the Supreme Court 
of the United States in Willner v. Committee on Character and 
Fitness,16 upon which reliance was placed in the present case.17 Judge 
Edgerton once summed up the applicable principle, although in a 
different context: "The government as landlord is still the government. 
It must not act arbitrarily, for, unlike private landlords, it is subject 
12 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 237, 204 N.E.2d 504, also noted in §13.6 infra. 
13 G.L., c. 30A, §I4. 
14 Id. §1(1). 
15 The Court expressly, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 237, 244, n.9, 204 N.E.2d 504, 511, n.S, 
eschewed consideration of the question whether the statutory, G.L., c. 112, §39, 
standard, "inconsistent with or opposed to the best interests of the public health, 
welfare or safety," is sufficiently explicit. 
16373 U.S. 96, S3 Sup. Ct. 1175, 10 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1963). 
171965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 237, 245, 204 N.E.2d 504, 509. 
3
O'Reilly: Chapter 11: Constitutional Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1965
112 1965 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §ll.l 
to the requirements of due process of law. Arbitrary action is not 
due process."18 
The Supreme Judicial Court, however, grounded its decision partly 
upon a premise that there is something like a substantive due process 
right to engage in a given occupation at a given place. Thus: 
... there will be careful judicial scrutiny of administrative 
regulatory activity tending to prevent qualified persons from 
engaging in an ordinary occupation to determine whether such 
regulatory activity has in fact any reasonable constitutional justi-
fication for the protection of the public rather than some merely 
private objective, such as protecting from new competition per-
sons already engaged in the occupation.19 
It is, of course, true that there is a constitutionally protected sub-
stantive right to engage in an occupation. Thus, while laundromats 
may be required to close during the late evening and early morning 
hours in the interest of deterring crime,20 there would be serious doubt 
of the validity of a mandate that they close altogether because of 
their competitive economic impact upon conventional laundries. 
This, however, has little, if anything, to do with the laundromat's 
right to a hearing. If the doubts were to be resolved in favor of gov-
ernment's power to abolish laundromats, the decision to do so could 
be made without a trial type hearing. When the city of Brockton 
revoked all "jitney bus" licenses in order to enable the street railway 
company to operate economically, the governing body acted legisla-
tively, not judicially.21 On the other hand, had the question been one 
of revoking a single "jitney bus" license for cause, there might well 
be a requirement that action be taken only. upon evidence taken 
under a hearing procedure. 
Association of a right to hearing with a high rank of the substan-
tive right in a scale of social values may be a reaction to the tradi-
tional rationalization of nonright to a hearing on the score that the 
substantive right involved was low on such a scale.22 In Milligan the 
Court overruled some of the cases in which licenses were classified, 
for revocation purposes, as "mere privileges."23 It is not clear, how-
ever, whether the Court was rejecting the nonsequitur that a licensee 
has no right to hearing on revocation because his license is not a 
thing with legal value, or was simply reassessing the places of various 
licenses in a scale of social values. 
18 Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1955). 
191965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 237, 243 n.8, 204 N.E.2d 504, 510 n.7. See also ibid., text 
of opinion. 
20 Anton's of Reading, Inc. v. Town of Reading, 346 Mass. 575, 195 N.E.2d 80 
(1964), noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1l.5. 
21 Burgess v. City of Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 126 N.E. 456 (1920). 
22 Commonwealth v. Kinsley, 133 Mass. 578 (1882). 
281965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 237, 247, 204 N.E.2d 504, 512: "Other cases (e.g. Morley v. 
Police Commr. of Boston, 261 Mass. 269, 277, [159 N.E. 41,43·44 (1927)] and Roberto 
v. Department of Pub. Util., 262 Mass. 583, 588, [160 N.E. 321, 322 (1928)]) are also 
not controlling in the light of the Willner case [note 16 supra] and similar decisions." 
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First Church of Christ, Scientist, in Boston v. Alcoholic Beverages 
Control Commission24 was a proceeding in certiorari for review of 
the Commission's approval of transfer of a liquor license from one 
location to another. The Court sustained a demurrer to the petition 
on the ground that Commission approval of a transfer of a license 
is not an adjudicatory proceeding under the Administrative Procedure 
Act. The opinion contains the cryptic recital, "Compare Milligan v. 
Board of Registration in Pharmacy."25 It is not clear whether this 
means that a liquor license, unlike a drugstore license, is a "mere 
privilege," or that the liquor case differs from the drugstore case on 
the score of the plaintiff's standing to sue. In Milligan,26 the Court 
placed emphasis upon the fact that, in an earlier case,27 holding that 
approval of a liquor license transfer is not adjudicatory, "[t]he ob-
jectors were competitors, not the transferor or the transferee of the 
license." Whether approval (or disapproval) by the Commission must 
be accompanied by a hearing at the request of the licensee remains 
to be seen. 
To the extent that the judicial process, in the evaluation of legis-
lation, is one of fixing the place of an individual right in a scale of 
social values, it is difficult (as it was in an earlier day with respect to 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States)28 to perceive the 
unifying element in the course of decisions to which the process may 
be applicable. To select instances from recent history,29 the judiciary 
will not acquiesce in legislative judgment as to the importance of 
regulating business hours for barber shops,80 but it will consider itself 
bound by the (municipal) legislative judgment as to the importance 
of requiring landlords to provide central heating facilities in apart-
ment buildings.a1 It will not go behind the legislative determination 
that the public interest is served by prohibiting racial discrimination 
in tenant selection in multiple-family dwellingsS2 (Would the same 
24 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 863, 207 N.E.2d 880, also noted in §13.4 infra. 
25Id. at 864, 207 N.E.2d at 881. 
261965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 237, 246-247, 204 N.E.2d 504, 512. 
27 Springfield Hotel Assn., Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission, 338 
Mass. 699, 157 N.E.2d 219 (1959), noted in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.1. 
28 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937 (1905); 
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324, 52 L. Ed. 551 (1908); Bunting v. 
Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 87 Sup. Ct. 485, 61 L. Ed. 880 (1916); Adkins v. Children's 
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 48 Sup. Ct. 894, 67 L. Ed. 785 (1923); Nebbia v. New York, 
291 U.S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934). The Supreme Court has ended this 
line of vacillation by paying almost unlimited deference to legislative judgment, at 
least in economic matters. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 842 U.S. 421, 72 
Sup. Ct. 405, 96 L. Ed. 469 (1952); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 848 U.S. 488, 75 
Sup. Ct. 461, 99 L. Ed. 568 (1955). 
29 See, in general, Substantive Due Process: Rights of the Individual, 1959 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §9.2. 
so Opinions of the Justices, 837 Mass. 796, 151 N.E.2d 681 (1958), 1959 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §9.2; 300 Mass. 615, 14 N.E.2d 953 (1988). 
81 Paquette v. City of Fall River, 838 Mass. 868, 155 N.E.2d 775 (1959), 1959 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §§9.2, 12.8. 
82 Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination v. Colangelo, 844 Mass. 887, 
182 N.E.2d 595 (1962), 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§10.1, 12.10, 18.17. 
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approach be made to a question under the statute forbidding discrimi-
nation in transfers of single-family dwellings?),88 but it will scrutinize 
the legislative judgment that imitation cream, however marketed, 
involves danger of consumer confusion.84 These are all matters as to 
which men undoubtedly have varying prudential judgments. The rub 
is in determining when a differing judicial judgment ceases to be 
merely prudential, and rises to the level of imposing a constitutional 
limitation. 
§1l.2. Taking or regulation: Methodology of determination. 
Despite the animadversions set forth in the preceding section, there 
is an area within which judges cannot avoid scrutinizing legislative 
judgments and making value determinations of their own. The State 
Constitution expressly,1 and the Federal Constitution by interpreta-
tion,2 both provide that when property is taken for public use, just 
compensation must be paid. If these provisions are to be enforced 
by the process of judicial review, as most constitutional provisions 
are, judges must decide whether a given act of government which 
leaves a property owner with less than complete dominion over his 
porperty amounts to a "taking." By the familiar shibboleth, some gov-
ernmental restrictions upon the completeness of dominion are "police 
regulations" and no compensation is due; others amount to "taking" 
for which payment must be made. Antipodally, these categories are 
clear and distinct. Thus, seizure of a fee simple title for a highway 
or a public building is a "taking,"S whereas prohibition of uses which 
would amount to public or private nuisance is "police regulation."4 
But between these two extremes is a vast area wherein the character-
ization of governmental acts is less than clear, and wherein closely 
reasoned judgments must be made. 
Commissioner of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co.1> was such a 
twilight-zone case, presented in a unique factual setting, and the 
Supreme Judicial Court outlined what promises to be a realistic prac-
tical technique of handling the underlying issue of whether state 
action is permissibly uncompensable regulation, or a taking for which 
payment must be made. 
It is a fact of marine biology that saltmarshes, which abound near 
the edges of ocean waters, support certain vegetable growt)ls which 
decay and release into the adjoining waters phosphates and nitrates, 
which in turn feed various marine microorganisms which are an im-
portant source of the food supply of shellfish and finfish in the 
88 G.L., c. 15lB, §4(7), as added by Acts of 1963, c. 197. 
34 Coffee·Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner of Public Health, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 155, 
204 N.E.2d 281. 
§i1.2. 1 Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. X. 
2 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 Sup. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322 
(1922). 
8 Higginson v. Inhabitants of Nahant, 11 Allen 530 (Mass. 1866). 
4 Baker v. Boston, 12 Pick. 184, 22 Am. Dec. 421 (Mass. 1831). 
/I 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 671, 206 N.E.2d 666, also noted in §14.23 infra. 
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waters. In 1963 the legislature took cognizance of this fact, and it 
enacted a conservation statute,6 forbidding the filling of marshes bor-
dering on coastal waters except under permission of the Director of 
Marine Fisheries. The defendant corporation had, in 1960, acquired 
saltmarsh land bordering on Onset Bay, a coastal water. It proposed 
to fill the marsh for the purpose of constructing housing with appur-
tenant water rights for boating. The plaintiff Commissioner refused 
to permit any filling of the marsh area. 
The Court ruled that the foregoing facts were not sufficient to 
enable it to resolve the constitutional issue sought to be presented. 
First, said the Court,7 there must be findings as to what uses can be 
made of the land in its natural state, either as an isolated parcel, or 
in connection with any adjacent land the corporation may own. (The 
denial of one particular proposed use in the interest of conservation 
of marine life does not necessarily constitute a taking.) Other factual 
matters which are relevant are: cost of acquisition; present market 
value (a) with, and (b) without the right to fill; the estimated cost 
of the proposed improvements; and any relevant zoning or other local 
regulations. 
The Court then went on8 to invite argument on the questions 
whether the prohibition of filling the marsh would constitute a tak-
ing if it should turn out that permitted uses of the land would not 
yield a reasonable return upon (a) the owner's investment, or (b) 
what would be the market value if the land could be filled; whether 
it is relevant if the marshland, as presently restricted, could profitably 
be used in conjunction with other land; and whether it is relevant 
that the marshland, in its natural state, is not suitable for residential 
or commercial use. (There may also be peculiar issues growing out 
of ancient esoteric rules governing ownership of and rights in tide-
lands.) 
This approach, of fragmenting the factual and legal issues involved 
in a particular case, would seem to indicate a departure from a pat· 
tern of making an intuitive judgment whether the line separating 
regulating from taking has been crossed.9 Judgment will continue to 
have to be made in these cases, but if the relevant factors of decision 
are carefully analyzed, as the present opinion indicates they should 
be, there can be a better articulated explanation of the judgments 
made. The law as to what constitutes a compensable taking will not 
be reduced to a mathematically precise formula, but, hopefully, deci-
sion will become more predictable than it is at present in this area. 
§11.3. Federal pre-emption. Perhaps the most sophisticated sort 
of judgment a court can be called upon to make in constitutional 
6 G.L., c. 130, §27A, inserted by Acts of 1963, c. 426. 
71965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 671,678, 206 N.E.2d 666, 671. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 Sup. Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 322 
(1922). Cf. dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, 260 U.S. at 416, 43 Sup. Ct. at 
160,67 L. Ed. at 326. Cf. Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 
(1964), noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§11.5, 14.1. 
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cases is one on the issue of whether Congress has pre-empted an area 
of regulation, so as to preclude or supersede state legislation in the 
area. 
The process of adjudication in these matters is usually much more 
than a matter of constitutional or statutory semantics. True, there is 
the rare case where a conflict between state and federal law is obvious, 
so that the latter, as the supreme law of the land, clearly prevails 
over the former. Thus, where a state law makes aliens ineligible to 
inherit property within the state, and a federal treaty provides that 
the nationals of a certain foreign government are eligible to inherit 
property within the United States, a claimant covered by the treaty 
is not barred by the disability imposed by the state law.1 
But the cases generally present the issue of pre-emption in much 
more subtle ways. They arise in situations where conflict between 
federal policy and state law does not appear on the surface, but must, 
if it exists, be ferreted out by esoteric insight. Thus, the enactment 
of the Federal Employers' Liability Act did not, on the face of the 
Act, bar workmen's compensation relief, under state laws, to railroad 
employees suffering injuries not caused by negligence. The Supreme 
Court, however, was able to perceive in the Act an over-all Congres-
sional design, not only to create tort liability for railroad employers 
where none had existed before, but also to set limits to the area in 
which such employers may be required to compensate their employees 
for on-the-job injuries. To the extent that state laws require compen-
sation beyond this area, they must yield to the unarticulated federal 
policy.2 
During the 1965 SURVEY year the Supreme Judicial Court wrestled 
with this type of problem in John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. 
Commissioner of Insurance.8 The company questioned the validity of 
a 1963 statute4 which provided, in substance, that policies, the pre-
miums for which are normally collected by the insurer's debit agents, 
will not terminate or lapse for nonpayment of premiums during any 
period that the debit agents are on strike, and that the insureds under 
such policies would be entitled to grace periods, for payment of pre-
miums, of thirty-one days following termination of such a strike. The 
Court ruled that the statute is invalid because it is incompatible with 
the federal policy effected by the Labor Management Relations Act.1I 
The premium moratorium statute, the argument runs, would oper-
ate to the disadvantage of the insurance companies by upsetting their 
calculations of anticipated income and setting awry the actuarial basis 
of their business. The operation of the statute would put economic 
pressure upon the companies, and thus it would give striking debit 
§1l.5. 1 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 504, 4 L. Ed. 97 (U.S. 1816). 
2 New York Central R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 57 Sup. Ct. 546, 61 L. Ed. 1045 
(1917). 
81965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1007, 208 N.E.2d 516, also noted in §15.11 infra. 
4 G.L., c. 175, §187F, inserted by Acts of 1965, c. 796. 
1161 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. §§151 et seq. 
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agents (who are employees of the companies) an additional weapon 
to be used at the bargaining table. For the state to furnish labor 
with such a weapon would not comport with the national policy 
which calls for "free collective bargaining." 
Putting the matter thus baldly greatly oversimplifies the problem 
and the Court's solution. By way of subsidiary explanation of the re-
sult it reached, the Court emphasized that the federal law protects 
the right of the individual debit agent not to strike, and also, in 
certain circumstances, it protects the right of the employer to hire 
replacements for strikers.6 That the premium moratorium statute 
would be effective to prevent lapse of a policy for nonpayment of 
premium, even though the insured's debit agent or a replacement 
made demands for payment during a strike, made the statute the more 
objectionable, in that its operation was in conflict with the federally 
protected rights not to strike and to hire replacements. 
Perhaps a point better made would have been that keying the 
moratorium to the duration of a strike rather than to a period of 
absence of personal demand for premiums characterizes the mora-
torium statute as "pro-debit agent," rather than "pro-insured." To 
have made this point, however, would have been to leave open the 
question whether a premium moratorium statute cast in other terms 
would be valid, even though its practical operation (because most 
debit agents will not refrain from striking, and the hiring of replace-
ments may be a risky thing) would be to subject the company to eco-
nomic pressure, and, to that extent, improve the bargaining position 
of the strikers. 
The purpose and history of the now invalidated premium mora-
torium law are obscure. Conceivably it was designed to protect the 
holder of a small insurance policy from forfeiture in the event of 
noncollection of premiums over which he has no real control. The 
fact that such a law is not categorized as a "labor law" would not 
necessarily save it from federal pre-emption if, in its operation, it has 
sufficient impact upon labor relations, any more than classifying con-
duct as a local tort can withdraw it from the exclusive Labor Board 
jurisdiction over an unfair labor practice.7 On the other hand, label-
ing a state statute a "labor law" is not necessarily sufficient to invali-
date it on the ground of federal pre-emption. It is doubtful, for 
example, that state laws requiring weekly payment of wages,S and 
other matters which have been lobbied through legislatures, have 
been invalidated by federal law simply because they have made it 
unnecessary for labor and management to bargain about their subject 
matters. 
61965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1007, 1020, 208 N.E.2d 516, 525. It would have been more 
accurate to say that the federal law does not make the hiring of replacements for 
strikers an unfair labor practice. Whatever right the employer has to hire replace-
ments of strikers he has under state law. 
7 Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 848 U.S. 468, 75 Sup. Ct. 480, 99 L. Ed. 546 
(1955); Gamer v. Teamsters, 846 U.S. 485, 74 Sup. Ct. 161, 98 L. Ed. 228 (195!J). 
8 For example, G.L., c. 149. §§148-159B. 
9
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A court, faced with an issue of pre-emption, must make its appraisal, 
on the basis of the federal law, of the policy which that law bespeaks, 
and then make its appraisal of the degree, if any, to which state law 
derogates from that policy. There is no formula to test the accuracy 
of such appraisals. Reasonable men can and have differed as to their 
accuracy.9 In the last analysis, they are acts of judgment by judges 
acting on one of the highest levels of responsibility of office. 
§11.4. Assistance of counsel. Ever since the Supreme Court of 
the United States decided Escobedo v. Illinois,1 a constantly recurring 
issue in criminal trials has been whether a preindictment statement 
made by the defendant to the police is rendered inadmissible by the 
circumstance that it was given in response to interrogations at a 
time when the defendant did not have the benefit of the assistance 
of counsel. Several cases decided during the 1965 SURVEY year involved 
this question, in one form or another. 
Escobedo, it will be recalled, had been suspected of complicity in 
a crime, and he was eventually brought into a police station for 
questioning. While there, he demanded to see the attorney who had 
been retained in his behalf. The police temporized with him, but 
effectively refused his request. Meanwhile the attorney, who had 
learned of Escobedo's detention, presented himself at the station and 
demanded access to his client. He was refused. Escobedo then made 
what turned out to be damaging statements. They were "voluntary," 
i.e., not induced by undue physical or psychological pressures. There 
was also the circumstance, stated in what has become a talismanic 
phrase, that the police attitude toward Escobedo had mounted from 
the "investigatory" to the "accusatory." The Supreme Court reversed 
Escobedo's conviction because taking the statements from him and 
using them in evidence against him amounted to invasion of his con-
stitutionally protected right to the assistance of counsel. The signifi-
cance of this decision for a case not on all fours is a question which 
has been plaguing criminal courts. 
Commonwealth v. Tracy2 was a murder case arising out of a shoot-
ing melee in the basement of a bank at about two o'clock in the 
morning. After a burglar alarm was set off by the defendant, who had 
entered the premises without right, a number of policemen arrived, 
and one was shot to death. The defendant was also shot, and was 
taken to a hospital. There he was interviewed, about five o'clock in 
the morning, by a policeman. He readily answered the questions, and 
his answers were introduced at the trial, which took place before the 
Escobedo decision. The Supreme Judicial Court, over a vigorous dis-
\I Compare the prevailing opinions and the dissents in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, g~O 
U.S. 497, 76 Sup. Ct. 477, 100 L. Ed. 640 (1956); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 69 
Sup. Ct. 841, 93 L. Ed. 1005 (1949); New York Central R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 
147, 37 Sup. Ct. 546, 61 L. Ed. 1045 (1917). 
§1l.4. 1378 U.S. 478, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964). See 1964 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §§11.3, 22.2. 
21965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 653, 207 N.E.2d 16, also noted in §12.3 infra. 
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sent of Justice Whittemore, ruled that there was no error, since Tracy, 
unlike Escobedo, had not requested the assistance of counsel in deal-
ing with the police interrogatories. 
That the circumstance that the accused did, or did not, ask for 
assistance of counsel is the determinative factor on the applicability 
of Escobedo, was emphasized a few weeks later. In Commonwealth v. 
Guerro3 a conviction was reversed because the trial court admitted 
statements obtained by the police from the accused after he had de-
manded, and had been refused, permission to call an attorney. There 
has been a definite split of authority in various other courts whether 
request for legal assistance is an essential element of the doctrine.4 
The process of imposing such a limitation on application of the doc-
trine cannot be rationalized as one of limiting Escobedo to the facts 
there involved. Thus, in Guerro it did not appear, as it did in 
Escobedo, that the accused had an attorney who came to the police 
station seeking his client. 
That the Court may not be irrevocably committed to applying 
Escobedo to instances where the accused demanded access to counsel 
before making his statements was indicated the day Guerro was 
handed down. In Commonwealth v. Kerrigan,r, the Court disbelieved 
the defendant's affidavits (in support of a motion for a new trial) 
averring that he had asked for an attorney and had been refused. 
Nonetheless the Court proceeded to consider whether he was entitled 
to the benefit of the Escobedo doctrine. In an opinion by Justice 
Whittemore (who had dissented in Tracy) the Court rejected the 
claim, but the decision was expressly put on the ground that the 
statements of the defendant had been elicited by the police before 
their investigation had reached the "accusatory" stage. The pertinent 
principle is stated with disarming simplicity in Escobedo: " ... [W]hen 
the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory - when its focus 
is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession - our adver-
sary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the 
accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer."6 That the line 
separating investigatory from accusatory is not crystal clear was 
brought out in a later episode of Kerrigan. After denial of the motion 
for a new trial, the defendant instituted collateral proceedings in 
federal court. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was not 
satisfied, from the recitals in the opinion of the state court, that it 
had correctly concluded, as it did, that the "accusatory" stage had not 
been reached. The district court was instructed to scrutinize the record 
on this point.7 
31965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 869, 207 N.E.2d 887, also noted in §12.3 infra. 
4 Compare, e.g., People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill. 2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964), cert. 
denied sub nom. Hartgraves v. Illinois, 380 U.s. 961 (1965), with People v. Dorado, 
42 Cal. R. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965), cert. denied sub nom. Dorado v. California, 
381 U.S. 946 (1965). 
IS 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 889, 207 N.E.2d 882, also noted in §12.3 infra. 
6378 U.s. 478,492,84 Sup. Ct. 1758, 1766, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977, 987 (1964). 
7 Kerrigan v. Scafati, 348 F.2d 187 (1st Cir. 1965). 
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The subtlety of the distinction between investigation and accusation 
is brought out in Commonwealth v. Lepore.s There had been a bur-
glary by three men, one of whom was apprehended by the police. 
On the basis of information given by this man, the police obtained 
a warrant for the search of certain premises, where the stolen goods 
were located. In serving the warrant, the police found two men pres-
ent and questioned them about their knowledge of the stolen goods. 
The Court rejected a contention that the replies were inadmissible 
under the Escobedo doctrine, stating that the police inquiries were 
"investigatory rather than accusatory," in that they gave the men "the 
opportunity to explain the compromising circumstances and helped 
the officers to appraise whether the two men were probably con-
cerned."9 The Court, again speaking through Justice Whittemore, 
(the case was subsequent to Tracy but prior to Kerrigan) expressly 
refrained from considering whether a demand for counsel was a neces-
sary condition precedent to invocation of the Escobedo doctrine. 
Another facet of Escobedo was touched upon in Commonwealth v. 
Ladetto.lO While decision in the former case was based immediately 
upon denial of opportunity for the accused and his counsel to confer, 
emphasis was also laid upon the fact that the police and the public 
prosecutor, while taking statements from the accused, did not inform 
him of his right to remain silent.ll In Ladetto it appeared that an 
accused murderer fled from the scene of the crime and was later ar-
rested in Maine by F.B.I. agents under a fugitive warrant. Immedi-
ately upon his arrest he blurted out an admission that he had done 
the killing. He repeated the admission in a Maine police station and 
in a Maine court. Upon his return to Massachusetts, he was interro-
gated in a local police station, a stenographer being present. Only 
after this interrogation was he advised of his right to use the telephone 
and to consult with a lawyer. He did not exercise this right, and later 
he was again interrogated, this time by a state police officer. On none 
of these occasions was he informed of his right to remain silent. 
The Court ruled that there was no error in the admission of the 
prisoner's statements and of his responses to the police interrogatories. 
As to the voluntary, spontaneous admission at the time of arrest, it 
held that there is no obligation on the arresting officer to refrain from 
listening to statements so offered. On a more doubtful point, the Court 
said that the subsequent statements were admissible because they 
were "simply confirmatory" of the original, voluntary admission. This 
ruling, however, might be dictum, since the Court pointed out that 
the stenographic record of the interrogation in the local police station 
was introduced at the trial on the motion of defense counsel, so that 
the defendant was in no position to complain of its submission to the 
S 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 691, 207 N.E.l!d 26, also noted in §12.3 infra. 
9 Id. at 693-694, 207 N .E.2d at 28. 
101965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 823, 207 N.E.2d 536, also noted in §§12.3, 12.6 infra. 
11 378 U.S. 478, 483, 485, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758, 1761. 1762, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977. 981, 982 
(1964). 
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jury. The Court proceeded, however, to rule that the defendant's con-
versation with the state police officer was admissible, on the score that 
it had taken place after he had been informed of his right to obtain 
counsel. 
Although the Court does not spell it out categorically, the Ladetto 
case seems to establish that failure of the police to warn an accused 
that he need not answer questions, and that any statements he makes 
may be used in evidence, does not render inadmissible statements 
made in response to police questioning. Escobedo's intimations to the 
contrary are dicta, since the United States Supreme Court was not 
required to reach this issue. The conflict, however, suggests that some 
attention should be given to considering regulation of police interro-
gation procedures either by legislation or by court rule. In Great 
Britain this has been done by "The Judges' Rules."12 These provide 
that a police officer may ask questions of anyone in the investigation 
of crime but, when the officer has cause to suspect an individual of 
the crime, he must warn such person of his right to remain silent. 
When a suspect voluntarily answers questions, a record must be made 
of the time and place of the questioning, and the answers must be 
reduced, verbatim, to writing and shown to the suspect for correction 
or amendment, and he must be asked to sign the document. Interest-
ingly enough, the English Rules do not provide for informing the 
suspect of his right to obtain counsel.13 
A related point was involved in Commonwealth v. Guerro.14 The 
defendant was arrested about noon and was not permitted to call 
counsel until after six o'clock. After seeing counsel, he was placed 
in a cell in the police station. Police officers eavesdropped on his con-
versation there with members of his family. The Supreme Judicial 
Court ruled that evidence of his statements, thus overheard, was admis-
sible. Relying upon Commonwealth v. Dougherty,1r. it ruled that 
Massiah v. United States16 was not applicable. In the latter case, po-
lice procurement of an informer to induce an indicted friend, who 
had retained counsel, to make a supposedly confid~ntial statement, 
was an infringement of the right of the accused to the assistance of 
counsel. The Court distinguished it on the ground that in Guerro 
the defendant's statements were not induced by police action. The 
relevance of Dougherty is not clear. The main point of that case was 
that, whatever the right of the individual not to have his privacy 
12 The Rules, as revised in 1964, are set out in Home Office Circular No. !l1/1964. 
They appear in [1964] 1 All E.R. 2!17. They are promulgated by the Court of 
Criminal Appeal as criteria for the admissibility of evidence. 
18 The Administrative Directions on Interrogation and the Taking of Statements, 
set forth in Home Office Circular No. 31/1964, indicate a policy of permitting an 
interrogated person to telephone his solicitor if this is practicable and consistent 
with the conduct of the interrogation. [1964] 1 All E.R. 2!17. 
141965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 869, 207 N.E.2d 887. See also text supported by note !I supra. 
15 !l4!1 Mass. 299, 178 N.E.2d 584 (1961), noted in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§§10.!I, 21.6. 
16 !l77 U.S. 201, 84 Sup. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1964). 
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invaded by a concealed microphone, such a right does not follow him 
into a police station. There was no question of infringement of the 
right to the assistance of counsel. After Guerro had retained counsel, 
Massiah clearly would preclude police interrogation in the absence of 
the attorney. It would probably also preclude police eavesdropping 
on a conference between the prisoner and his counsel, even in the 
police station. Whether police eavesdropping on other conversations 
of the prisoner constituted an unwarranted dilution of his right is 
a question which deserved a more thorough treatment. 
Escobedo may be thought of as extending the right of an accused 
to the assistance of counsel from the courtroom to the police station. 
But what would be the impact of the doctrine in the case of the 
accused who desires the assistance of counsel, who is not prevented 
from calling counsel, but is too poor to retain counsel? Unlike 
judges,17 the police have no inherent power to provide counsel to 
serve without compensation. Even the Criminal Justice Act of 196418 
makes no provision for counsel for the poor at the time of arrest. It 
does, however, provide for the appointment of counsel by the com-
missioner on a probable cause hearing. Since, under the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure,10 a federal prisoner must be brought before a 
commissioner as soon as possible, there is a minimal danger of loss 
of right to the assistance of counsel. Not all states, however, have 
adopted the federal requirement of immediate presentation to a com-
mitting magistrate, and a delay in the furnishing of counsel may well 
involve serious consequences to an indigent accused. This consider-
ation may well underscore the importance of giving thought to put-
ting police interrogation under formal regulation. 
§1l.5. Detention and arrest: Probable cause. A year ago the 
Supreme Judicial Court sustained, as constitutionally permissible, a 
police practice of detention upon suspicion, for "threshold inquiry," 
as distinct from arrest for probable cause.1 On that occasion, the 
authority of the police officers was grounded primarily upon the 
statute2 which expressly permits such detention in the nighttime. 
During the 1965 SURVEY year, the Supreme Judicial Court recognized 
a power in the police to detain a person upon suspicion in the day-
time. . 
In Commonwealth v. Roy,S it appeared that there had been a series 
of housebreaks in the community. At about two o'clock one afternoon 
17 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 Sup. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963), 
discussed in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.3. 
18 Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. 88-455, 18 U.S.C. §3006A (1964). 
19 Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a). See Mallory v. United States. 354 U.S. 449, 77 Sup. Ct. 
1356, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1479 (1957); McNabb v. United States. 318 U.S. 332. 63 Sup. Ct. 
608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943). 
§11.5. 1 Commonwealth v. Lehan. 1147 Mass. 197, 196 N.E.2d 840 (1964), noted in 
1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§11.2, 12.2, 22.1. 
2 G.L., c. 41, §98. 
S 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 799, 207 N.E.2d 284, also noted in §§12.2, 12.11 infra. 
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two policemen on patrol saw a man standing at a bus stop beside a 
suitcase. When one of the officers looked at him, he looked away, and 
the officer decided to question him. The defendant, about "a second" 
later, came out of a nearby store and joined them. The defendant 
gave the officer a name and address, but the other man declined to 
confirm that this was the correct name and address. The defendant, 
in response to a question, said that the suitcase contained clothes. 
At the officer's request, he opened the suitcase, revealing that it con-
tained not clothes, but a small filing cabinet. He stated that the cabi-
net was locked, but the officer observed that it was not. The defendant 
then opened the cabinet, revealing some papers. The suitcase was 
marked with the initials, "P. Q.," which did not correspond to the 
name given by the defendant. The latter's explanation was that the 
suitcase belonged to his uncle, but he declined to give the uncle's name. 
(In fact, the initials stood for Paul Queeny, from whose home the 
suitcase and cabinet had been stolen. The theft, however, was not 
brought to the attention of the police until after four o'clock that 
day.) The officer then asked the two men if they "would mind coming 
to the police station to get this confused story you're telling us straight-
ened out." The men accepted the invitation, and were questioned 
at the station. 
The Court sustained the trial judge'S denial of a motion to suppress 
the contents of the suitcase, on the ground that exposure of the filing 
cabinet and its contents was the voluntary act of the defendant, not 
the result of a seizure by the officers. The Court characterized it as 
"incidental to a reasonable and brief on-the-street inquiry by alert 
police officers."4 While the Court took the position that the making 
of such inquiry was the right, and perhaps the duty, of the officers, 
it declined to specify the point at which "detention for inquiry" 
became "arrest." On the particular facts of the case, such specification 
was unnecessary, but in slightly different circumstances it may become 
necessary for the Court to throw light into gray areas and cast out 
guidelines for differentiating suspicion from probable cause, detention 
from arrest. 
The subtlety of some of the distinctions is brought out in a case 
decided earlier during the 1965 SURVEY year. Commonwealth v. 
Lawton5 grew out of another housebreak. The householder reported 
to the police that the alleged burglar, wearing a dark jacket, had 
run out of the house and across an adjoining golf course. This infor-
mation was broadcast over the police radio, and the message was 
received by an officer on patrol. He proceeded to a bus stop on the 
opposite side of the golf course, where he saw the defendant, wearing 
a heavy black jacket. The temperature was nearly ninety degrees, and 
the time was after eleven o'clock in the evening. The officer questioned 
the defendant, who refused to state what he was doing there, and also 
refused to give his name. The officer then took him into custody as 
4Id. at 803, 207 N.E.2d at 287. 
51964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1277, 202 N.E.2d 824, also noted in §12.2 infra. 
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being a person abroad in the nighttime, suspected of unlawful design, 
and not giving a satisfactory account of himself.6 At the police station, 
the defendant was searched, and the proceeds of the housebreak, to-
gether with burglar tools, were taken from him. He was then charged 
with breaking and entering the house near the golf course. 
Before and during trial, the defendant asked for suppression of the 
evidence because it had been seized otherwise than incident to a law-
ful arrest. (Lehan7 had held that seizure incident to preliminary deten-
tion is not lawful.) The Court, however, held that the episode at the 
bus stop had constituted a lawful arrest. Although the officer probably 
thought that he was dealing simply with a "suspicious" person, he 
in fact had "probable cause" to believe that the defendant had com-
mitted a felony. He knew of the felony, he knew that the probable 
felon wore a dark jacket, and the sight of a man, wearing a heavy 
dark jacket in hot weather, in an area toward which the felon had run, 
could lead him to believe that the man before him was probably the 
felon. Since the officer had probable cause and an arrest would have 
been justified, concluded the Court, the placing of the man in custody 
is to be treated as an arrest, not a mere detention. 
Another cases posed the question whether a confession should have 
been suppressed on the ground that it was obtained during a period 
of illegal arrest. The legality of the arrest depended upon the exist-
ence of probable cause to believe that the accused was a participant 
in a bank robbery. At a voir dire hearing preliminary to the admis-
sion of the confession at the trial, there was evidence tending to 
indicate that the police, at the time of the arrest, knew (presumably 
from an informer, although the latter's name and what information 
he gave were not revealed) the names of the participants in the hold-
up, where they stood in the bank during the holdup, statements made 
by them during the holdup, and the fact that part of the money stolen 
was burned. This knowledge, the Court held, sufficed to justify the 
arrest of the defendant, who had been identified to the police as one 
of the participants. 
This decision appears to go far in permitting arrests on the basis 
of probable cause. No showing was made as to the content or the 
trustworthiness of whatever disclosures were made to the police by 
their unrevealed source of information. Certainly, if there had been 
no showing of what information the police had (or thought they had) 
there could have been no finding that they had probable cause for 
arrest.O Although arresting officers are not held to the standard of 
having adequate legal evidence of the guilt of the arrested person,lO 
they must have proof of a substantial nature. This is the criterion for 
6 G.L., c. 41, §98. 
7 Commonwealth v. Lehan, 1I47 Mass. 197, 196 N.E.2d 840 (1964). See note 1 supra. 
S Commonwealth v. Young, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 749, 206 N.E.2d 694, also noted in 
§§12.2, 12.1I infra. 
o Beck v. Ohio, 1I79 U.S. 89, 85 Sup. Ct. 2211, III L. Ed. 2d 142 (1964). 
10 Jones v. United States, 1I62 U.S. 257, 80 Sup. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960). 
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magistrates who issue warrants.ll There is no good reason for setting 
a lesser rule for arrests without warrant.12 
In Commonwealth v. Mayer18 the justification for an arrest was 
clearer. There a police officer was told by the manager and two em-
ployees of a hotel that two revolvers and some bullets were in a 
certain room. A person was identified to him as one who had 
registered alone for the room. The officer arrested the man and 
searched his person, finding in his pocket a key to the room. Since 
the officer's experience indicated that an individual seldom is licensed 
to carry more than one gun, he had probable cause to believe that 
possession of a second gun was a felony.14 Identification of the defend-
ant as the registered occupant of the room, made by a member of 
the hotel staff, gave him reason to believe that the felony had been 
committed by the defendant. In these circumstances, the search of the 
defendant's pockets was, of course, authorized as incident to a lawful 
arrest. 
In Commonwealth v. Lillis15 the Court dealt with two phases of 
the warrant statute.16 It seemed that one Lillis and one Nikas had 
each been identified as having shot a pistol on separate occasions. 
The bullets had been recovered, and had been, in the opinion of a 
ballistics expert, fired from the same pistol. Lillis was arrested at the 
home of Nikas. An affidavit setting forth these facts was held sufficient 
to support a warrant for the search of the Nikas home for the pistol, 
since they warranted an inference that the gun fired by both Lillis 
and Nikas might have been hidden in the place where both men were 
found together. 
The warrant itself described the place to be searched as "the apart-
ment numbered 106 Pleasant Street occupied by Louis Nikas, 1st and 
2nd Hoors and basement." In fact, the Nikas apartment included space 
in the basement and on the first Hoor, but not on the second Hoor. 
The Court held that the description was not too broad because, 
despite the erroneous reference to the second Hoor, the warrant spe-
cifically authorized search only of what was in fact the Nikas apart-
ment. 
In Commonwealth v. Fancy,17 another warrant case, the Court held 
that the statute which authorized warrants for the search of "a par-
ticular house or place"18 covered a warrant for the search of a motor 
11 United States v. Ventresca, 1180 U.S. 102, 85 Sup. Ct. 741, III L. Ed. 2d 684 (1965). 
12 Cf. Commonwealth v. Fancy, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 771, 207 N.E.2d 276, and text 
supported by note 17 infra, where the Court places on the defendant (at least on a 
pretrial motion to suppress evidence) the burden of establishing the illegality of a 
seizure. However, in that case the record affirmatively showed, by evidence produced 
at the trial, that a warrant had in fact been issued. 
18 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 841, 207 N.E.2d 686. 
14 G.L. c. 269, §10. 
151965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1051, 209 N.E.2d 186. 
16 G.L., c. 276, §1. 
17 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 771, 207 N.E.2d 276. 
18 G.L., c. 276, §1. 
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vehicle. The Court refused to believe that a legislature which would 
sanction searches of homes, "the citadels of privacy,"19 would have 
made vehicles exempt from search. The fact that a subsequent amend-
ment20 of the warrant statute expressly provided for warrants for 
search of motor vehicles did not affect this conclusion. It was "merely 
clarifying legislation."21 
§1l.6. Freedom of speech: Obscenity. The scope of the consti-
tutional freedom of expression is a matter on which the Supreme 
Judicial Court continues to divide. The minority which, three years 
ago, would have condemned Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer1 was 
joined by Justice Spalding and became a majority of four justices, so 
that the Court condemned John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of 
Pleasure,2 perhaps better known as Fanny Hill, as obscene, indecent, 
or impure.s 
The novel, which deals at length with the unorthodox and unnat-
ural sex life of the central character, is unquestionably pornographic, 
in a popular sense of that term. Written in an eighteenth-century 
literary style, it is not explicit in detail, and the author does not use 
"four-letter words," but the general effect of theme and treatment is 
such that all seven justices found it offensive, if not disgusting. Ex-
perts from the academic community testified that it has literary merit 
and historical value. 
The whole Court seemed in agreement that the book falls within 
the Roth4 standard of obscenity, viz., the dominant theme of the work, 
taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest. The difference among 
the justices was centered over the questions, (1) is the book, notwith-
standing this, to be spared classification as obscene because it has social 
importance; and (2) how is this issue to be resolved? 
The majority refused to identify "minimal literary value" with "so-
cial importance."1i Without defining the latter phrase affirmatively, the 
Court said that it does not indicate that a book must be "unquali-
fiedly worthless" before it can be held to be obscene. The conclusion 
was reached, upon all of the evidence, "including the book," that the 
requisite social importance was not present. 
The minority disagreed sharply. Merit of any kind, including lit-
erary or historical, they said, gives social importance which furnishes 
constitutional protection. Two of them explicitly, and the other in-
ferentially, questioned the propriety of the Court's disregard of the 
19 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 771, 778, 207 N.E.2d 276, 282. 
20 Acts of 1963, c. 96, §l. 
21 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 771, 778, 207 N.E.2d 276, 282. 
§1l.6. 1 Attorney General v. The Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," 345 Mass. 1, 
184 N.E.2d 328 (1962), noted in 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §10.4. 
2 Attorney General v. A Book Named "john Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of 
Pleasure," 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 635, 206 N.E.2d 403. 
S G.L., c. 272, §§28C, 28E, 28F. 
4 Roth v. United States, Alberts v. California, 254 U.S. 476, 77 Sup. Ct. 1304, 1 
L. Ed. 2d 1498 (1957). 
Ii 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 635, 639, 206 N.E.2d 403, 405. 
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expert testimony of the academic witnesses, and its making its own 
resolution of the issue. The latter point, of course, is pertinent only 
to the extent that the first point has validity. The raising of the point, 
however, again calls attention to the potentially important question, 
passed over in Tropic of Cancer, of the proper role of the expert wit-
ness in obscenity cases. 
The imponderables of the laws dealing with obscenity are neces-
sarily, though not always explicitly, factors in the decision of cases 
having to do with speech and press. The basic policies of the First 
Amendment are ever in the background of decision, and judges are 
wary, lest a decision adversely affecting a relatively unimportant in-
terest become an opening wedge for a serious undermining of some of 
those policies. Then, too, the specifics of litigation in this area are not 
conventional subjects of drawing-room conversation, and there may be 
a cultivated tendency to resort to euphemism in the expression of the 
legal rules. This is not calculated to promote clarity in the st~tement 
of the standards. Again, moral indignation, on the one hand, and 
civil libertarian zeal, on the other, can readily be brought to bear in 
this sort of case, so that it is difficult to avoid the coloring of conclu-
sions by subjective feelings. Finally, in the drawing of constitutional 
guidelines, the Supreme Court of the United States has not been as 
helpful as it might have been. In Roth6 and subsequent cases,7 indi-
vidual justices subscribed to (or dissented from) the judgments of the 
Court for a variety of reasons, and the Court has decided others per 
curiam8 on the authority of such decisions. The publisher of Fanny 
Hill has taken an appeal from the Massachusetts decisions.9 If the 
United States Supreme Court takes the case, it will have a vehicle with 
which to spell out somewhat the meaning of such baffiing terms as 
"hard core pornography," "social importance," and the like. 
§1l.7. Equal protection: Affirmative state action. Ever since the 
Civil Rights Cases, 1 orthodox doctrine has been that only "state ac-
6254 U.S. 476, 77 Sup. Ct. 1304, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498 (1957). 
7 A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 84 Sup. Ct. 1723, 12 L. Ed. 2d 809 
(1964); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 84 Sup. Ct. 1676, 12 L. Ed. 2d 793 (1964); 
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.s. 58, 83 Sup. Ct. 631, 9 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1963). 
See also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 Sup. Ct. 734, 13 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1965). 
8 Trans-Lux Distr. Corp. v. Board of Regents, 380 U.S. 259, 85 Sup. Ct. 952, 13 
L. Ed. 2d 959 (1965); Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 577, 84 Sup. Ct. 1909, 12 
L. Ed. 2d 1035 (1964); Tralins v. Gerstein, 378 U.S. 576, 84 Sup. Ct. 1903, 12 L. Ed. 2d 
1033 (1964); Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372, 78 Sup. Ct. 365, 2 
L. Ed. 2d 352 (1958); One, Incorporated v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371, 78 Sup. Ct. 364, 
2 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1958). 
9 G. P. Putnam's Sons v. Attorney General, No. 368, October Term, 1965, 33 U.S.L. 
Week 3056 Ouly 27, 1965). The Supreme Court has agreed to take a possibly similar 
case. Ginzburg v. United States, 338 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 380 U.S. 
961 (1965) (No. 42, October Term, 1965). It involves publications with such titles as 
Eros, The Housewife's Handbook on Selective Promiscuity, and Liaison. All are 
admittedly pornographic, and the petitioners seek to present the question whether 
they can be classified as obscene. 
§11.7. 1109 U.S. 3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18,27 L. Ed. 835 (1883). 
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tion" is inhibited by the restrictions imposed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment in favor of individual freedom. The routine formula has 
been that, so far as federal constitutional limitations are concerned, 
individuals are free to pick and choose their associations, even to the 
point of treating their fellow citizens in a discriminatory manner. 
In recent years this freedom has been qualified, to the extent that it 
is constitutionally forbidden insofar as it may require the invocation 
of governmental sanctions for its effectiveness. Thus, a private cove-
nant in a deed of real estate, restricting transfer of the property on a 
racial basis, is not constitutionally forbidden per se, but its enforce-
ment by a state court, by decree of specific performance,2 or by money 
judgment for breach,s would be a violation of the constitutional man-
date of equal protection of the laws. The use of any state instrumen-
tality4 or function ll to accomplish a discriminatory end forbidden the 
state itself is prohibited. 
The course of decision has tended to suggest the question whether, 
as a corollary, the state is coming to be under an obligation to take 
affirmative action to prevent individuals from doing things which the 
state itself is forbidden to do in this area. 
Barksdale v. Springfield School Committee8 approached this ques-
tion. Involved was the not atypical situation of the population pattern 
of the city having developed so that nonwhites (Negroes and Puerto 
Ricans) lived for the most part in ghettos only sparsely, if at all, 
inhabited by whites. Attendance of pupils at the public schools was 
under the neighborhood plan, so called; i.e., each school building was 
designated to serve the children resident in the neighboring district. 
The district lines had been drawn in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, probably before any substantial influx of nonwhites into the 
city, and certainly without reference to the places of residence of such 
persons. 
The consequence of the situation was that many of the city schools 
were heavily populated with nonwhite pupils, a condition popularly 
referred to as "de facto segregation." The district court found that 
schools with predominantly nonwhite pupil population are educa-
tionally inferior to schools with all-white pupil population and to 
schools where the pupil population is more nearly equally balanced. 
The court answered in the affirmative its own question,7 "whether 
there is a constitutional duty to provide equal educational opportuni-
ties for all children within the [school] system," and it ordered the 
school committee to formulate a plan to eliminate to the fullest pos-
sible extent racial concentration in the schools within the framework 
of effective educational procedures. 
2 Shelley v. Kraemer, 884 u.s. 1,68 Sup. Ct. 886, 92 L. Ed. 1175 (1948). 
8 Barrows v. Jackson, 846 u.s. 249, 78 Sup. Ct. 1081, 97 L. Ed. 1586 (1958). 
4 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 865 U.S. 715, 81 Sup. Ct. 856, 6 L. Ed. 
2d 45 (1961). 
II Smith v. Allwright, 821 U.s. 649, 64 Sup. Ct. 757, 88 L. Ed. 987 (1944). 
8287 F. Supp. 548 (D. Mass. 1965). 
7Id. at 546. 
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This conclusion, that a school board has an affinniltive duty, under 
the Constitution, to take action to prevent or counteract racial segre-
gation in the schools, is in conflict with the view which has prevailed 
elsewhere.s 
For the time being, however, the point has been rendered moot. On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated the order,9 not reaching the con-
stitutional issue. It held that, since the school committee had been, at 
the time suit was commenced, embarked upon an effort to correct the 
racial imbalance in the schools, the complaint should have been dis-
missed for want of equity, but without prejudice to the rights of the 
plaintiffs if circumstances should change. 
§1l.8. Public purpose. It is familiar formula that public funds 
may be spent only for public purposes, and private property may be 
taken forcibly only for public use.1 Unfortunately for those who would 
like to see legal doctrine reduced to formulas, this particular one is of 
limited utility in the solution of concrete cases. Public and private 
purposes, public and private uses, are not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive alternatives in a given context. Problems in this area were pre-
sented in three cases during the 1965 SURVEY year. 
Village on the Hill, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority2 was 
a land condemnation case. The industrial property of Rivett was 
taken for part of the Turnpike Extension into Boston. Other land in 
the same general area, near the Turnpike Extension, was made avail-
able to Rivett as a relocation site. This land, however, had no access 
roads to public streets. The Authority also took, for purposes of the 
Turnpike Extension, a portion of a public street in the area, and it 
became necessary to relocate the street. It was originally planned to 
run the relocation of the street and an extension thereof through 
other land of the Authority, north of Village'S land. It developed, 
however, that the elevations and contours of that and other adjoining 
land were such that more desirable slopes and grades would be 
achieved if the relocated street were lengthened and run to the south-
ward, through Village's land. The relocated street, constructed there, 
could be extended, through other land of the Authority, to Rivett's 
relocation site, so as to constitute an access road for that site. 
Village sued for declaratory relief and an injunction against the tak-
ing, on the ground that its land would be used. for the benefit of 
Rivett, rather than of the public. On the basis of findings of the trial 
court, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the engineering consid-
erations of having optimum grades justified the routing of the relo-
cated street through Village's property, so that whatever benefit en-
S Downs v. Board of Education, 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 
U.S. 914 (1965); Bell v. School City of Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 
377 U.S. 924 (1964). 
9 Springfield School Committee v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965). 
§1l.8. 1 Salisbury Land 8c Improvement Co. v. Commonwealth, 215 Mass. 371, 102 
N.E. 619 (1913). 
21964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1245, 202 N.E.2d 602, also noted in §§14.4, 14.24 infra. 
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ured to Rivett from an extension of the new route was simply inci-
dental. 
A more difficult problem was tendered in Moskow v. Boston Re-
development Authority.3 The Authority, as part of its Government 
Center project, proposed to take the building at No. 28 State Street, 
occupied by New England Merchants National Bank, in connection 
with a proposed widening of Congress Street, on which the building 
abutted. Originally, the proposal did not include taking the building 
at No. 10 State Street, which was on the opposite side of Congress 
Street. The bank was opposed to the taking of No. 28, and eventually 
the terms of the Project were amended, so as to provide for the taking 
of No. 10, the razing of the building, the construction of a new tower 
building on the site by a redeveloper, and the rental of a part of the 
new building to the bank. Pending construction of the new building, 
the bank would continue to operate at No. 28. 
The owners of No. 10 sued to restrain the taking, alleging that: 
"The primary purpose of the taking of the plaintiffs' land was not the 
public interest, but was to provide a site for a new private office build-
ing to be occupied by the defendant bank. The taking was made 
ostensibly in connection with a redevelopment project of the Author-
ity .... " The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the plaintiffs' bill 
failed to state a case. Proceeding from the starting point that a rede-
velopment authority's determination that a particular parcel should 
be included in an urban renewal project is final and not subject to 
judicial review,4 it pointed out that, apart from the above quoted con-
clusion, the bill did not set forth facts to support the inference that 
the Authority had acted improperly in including No. 10 within the 
project area. The allegation that the inclusion of the parcel was the 
outcome of conferences between representatives of the bank and mem-
bers of the Authority staff was insufficient, since it did not impute any 
collusion to the members of the Authority nor recite that the staff 
members had been authorized. by the Authority to act in collusion 
with the bank for the latter's private purposes. Two of the Justices 
regarded this point as a quibble, and voted to set the case down for 
hearing on the merits of the claim that the taking of No. 10 was for 
private, not public purposes. 
The third discussion of public purpose came in an advisory opin-
ion.1i The Senate had under consideration a bill to deal with problems 
presented by the prospective dislocation of holders of liquor licenses 
by urban renewal operations in Boston. The premises occupied by 
many such licensees were scheduled to be taken by eminent domain. 
Relocation of such licensees in other parts of the city would be im-
practicable in most such cases because other neighborhoods are al-
a 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1203, 210 N.E.2d 699, also noted in §14.31 infra. 
4 Worcester Knitting Realty Co. v. Worcester Housing Authority, 335 Mass. 19, 138 
N.E.2d 356 (1956). 
Ii Opinion of the Justices, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1037, 208 N.E.2d 823. See also 
§14.24 infra. 
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ready adequately supplied with licensed liquor establishments. Fur-
thermore, partly because of a substantial decline in the population of 
Boston in recent years, there is a disproportionately high number of 
outstanding liquor licenses in the city. This tends to bring keen com-
petition which leads, in some instances, to evasion and avoidance of 
the applicable regulations, which the available facilities are physically 
unable to enforce. 
The proposal was to give dislocated licensees an option to surrender 
their licenses to the licensing board for cancellation. Upon the sur-
render and retirement of the license, the city treasurer would pay the 
licensee compensation according to a schedule keying the amount of 
compensation to the period after enactment within which the license 
would be surrendered. 
The Justices were of opinion that the proposed authorization for 
compensation would be a provision for payment out of the public 
treasury for a public purpose. The retirement of liquor licenses so as 
to bring the number of outstanding licenses down to an optimum level 
is a public purpose for which public funds may be expended. The 
licensees have no vested property rights in their licenses, and would 
have no constitutional right to compensation if all licenses were re-
voked, as by the passage of a prohibition law.6 In fact many, if not 
most, dislocated licensees might lose their licenses by attrition, because 
the law provides for lapse of a license in such case if, within four 
years, the licensee does not find an approved relocation site.7 The 
Justices were of opinion that, despite these considerations, the private 
benefit to the licensees was only incidental to the public benefit which 
would be attained by retirement of excess licenses. Undoubtedly they 
were influenced to this conclusion by the consideration that there is 
something of a moral, although not legal, obligation to make some 
amends to a licensee who has lost valuable rights in consequence of 
public activity such as urban renewal or redevelopment. 
§11.9. Auditor's report and right to jury trial. The use of auditors 
in civil cases is a practice of long standing in the courts of Massachu-
setts. l In appropriate cases, under the governing statutes and rules of 
court, auditors hear evidence and make findings which may have evi-
dentiary value at a subsequent trial before a jury. The constitutional-
ity of this practice has been established for many years.2 
In Baldassare v. Crown Furniture Co.S there was a novel attack 
upon the practice. The contention was raised that giving evidentiary 
6 C.L., c. 138, §23; Jubinville v. Jubinville, 313 Mass. 103, 46 N.E.2d 533 (1943); see 
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 u.S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205 (1887). 
7 C.L., c. 138, §23B; New City Hotel Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Com· 
mission, 347 Mass. 539, 199 N.E.2d 184 (1964), discussed in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§13.10. 
§11.9. I Authorization of such practice goes back to Acts of 1817, c. 142. 
2 Holmes v. Hunt, 122 Mass. 505 (1877). 
81965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 759, 207 N.E.2d 268, also noted in §2.6 supra. 
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effect to an auditor's findings was an infringement of a federal consti-
tutional right to trial by jury. 
Historically, of course, the Federal Constitution has not been read 
as requiring a jury trial in state courts" The Seventh Amendment, re-
citing that, "[i]n Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served," has been regarded as addressed to the United States, not to 
the states. 
At least since 1925, however, there has been a growing line of deci-
sions of the Supreme Court of the United States, holding that certain 
rights enuring to the individual vis-a-vis the Federal Government by 
reason of the first eight (or nine) amendments of the Federal Consti-
tution must also be respected by the states by reason of due process 
clause of the Fourteenth. Relying upon Gitlow v. New York/' Gideon 
v. Wainwright,6 and Mapp v. Ohio,7 the defendant in the Baldassare 
case argued that, through the Fourteenth Amendment, the state was 
obliged to follow the provisions of the Seventh Amendment, and was 
therefore not permitted to use an auditor's report as evidence before 
a jury.s 
The Supreme Judicial Court found it unnecessary to inquire whether 
the major premise of this argument was sound. It dismissed the con-
tention, pointing out that the Seventh Amendment had never been 
construed to bar the use of auditors, even in the federal courts.9 
§ll.IO. Equal protection: Establishment of discrimination. Claims 
of denial of equal protection of the laws were heard in several cases 
during the 1965 SURVEY year. Inequality of valuations in the assess-
ment of property taxes was the context in which two of the claims 
were made. The State Constitution requires that assessments upon 
property be "proportional,"1 and the statutes provide that taxable 
property be assessed at full and fair cash value.2 
One taxpayer, contending that the assessors had increased the as-
sessed value of some 20 per cent of the land in the community, includ-
ing his own, but had not increased the value of the remaining land, 
4 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 27 L. Ed. 678 (1875). 
11268 U.S. 652,45 Sup. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925). 
6372 U.S. 335, 83 Sup. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963), noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §11.3. 
7367 U.S. 643, 81 Sup. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), noted in 1961 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §10.4; 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§10.2, 11.7,21.6; 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §§10.2, 21.1. 
S More recent cases, containing discussions of the mooted question whether Four-
teenth Amendment due process "incorporates" provisions of the Bill of Rights as 
limitations upon the states, are: Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 Sup. Ct. 1229, 
14 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 Sup. Ct. 1065, 13 L. Ed. 2d 
923 (1965); Mu~hy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 84 Sup. Ct. 1594, 12 L. 
Ed. 2d 678 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 Sup. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653 
(1964). In none of these cases was the Seventh Amendment involved. 
9 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 759, 765, 207 N.E.2d 268, 273. 
§11.10. 1 Mass. Const., Part II, c. 1, §1, art. 4. 
2 G.L., c. 59, §§38, 52. 
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sought declaratory relief in the Superior Court on the ground that the 
action of the assessors had been illegally discriminatory against him. 
The Supreme Judicial Court did not reach the constitutional issue, 
but sustained a demurrer to the bill because the facts upon which the 
claim was based were not set forth in sufficiently clear detail,S 
In another case," however, a taxpayer instituted abatement proceed-
ings, and appealed from an adverse decision of the assessors to the 
Appellate Tax Board. There he attempted to prove that, although the 
taxpayer's property was not assessed at more than 100 per cent of its 
full fair cash value, other property in the community was assessed at 
a lower ratio of cash value than was the taxpayer's. The Board re-
jected proffered evidence, on the ground that a showing of discrimina-
tion as against other taxpayers would not entitle the complaining tax-
payer to relief by way of abatement. The Supreme Judicial Court re-
versed, holding that if the taxpayer could show intentional, system-
atic undervaluation by the assessors of property of other owners, the 
discrimination against the complaining taxpayer is an invasion of his 
constitutionally protected right, and he must be accorded a remedy. 
The cure for disproportionate assessment is not to order the assessors 
to increase the assessments of the favored owners, but to reduce the 
complaining taxpayer's assessment to the point where it would have 
been had he been given the treatment the favored owners received.1> 
Because of the constitutional necessity of providing a remedy for 
the victim of tax discrimination, the Court overruled an earlier inter-
pretation of the abatement law,6 which would have limited the pow-
ers of the Appellate Tax Board to cases of assessments in excess of full, 
fair cash value.7 The Board may take cognizance of overassessments 
which are so categorized simply because of underassessment of other 
property. 
The application for abatement in the second case was far less spe-
cific and to the point than the bill of complaint in the first case. The 
difference in result in the two cases is probably attributable in part to 
judicial reluctance to have courts interpose themselves into the assess-
ing process. Of equal importance, however, is the fact that the second 
taxpayer, by offers of proof, got its theory of the case on record, and it 
was understood and rejected by the Board. 
The flexibility of Board procedures, and its power to consolidate 
cases and to admit intervenors, may well give the Shoppers' World de-
cision the practical significance of constituting the Appellate Tax 
Board the equivalent of a board of equalization for every taxing area 
in the Commonwealth. 
S Leto v. Board of Assessors of Wilmington, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1295, 202 N.E.2d 
922, also noted in §18.00 infra. 
"Shoppers' World, Inc. v. Board of Assessors of Framingham, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
93, 203 N.E.2d 811, also noted in §18.00 infra. 
I> The Court followed Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 43 
Sup. Ct. 190, 67 L. Ed. 340 (1923). 
6 G.L., c. 59, §§59, 64, 65. 
7 Lowell v. County Commissioners, 152 Mass. 372,25 N.E. 469 (1890). 
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An interesting equal protection point was raised in a case8 brought 
under the Retail Instalment Contract Act.9 That statute regulates in-
stallment sales of motor vehicles. Under it, a sales finance company is 
defined as including (I) banks, and (2) persons engaged in the busi-
ness of purchasing retail installment contracts from retail sellers of 
motor vehicles. Sales finance companies, other than banks as defined 
in General Laws, Chapter 167, and national banking associations, are 
required to be licensed. 
The case was a proceeding for a declaratory judgment. The main 
thrust of it was a challenge of the Commissioner of Banks' interpre-
tative regulation prescribing the manner of computing refunds of por-
tions of the contractual finance charges in cases in which the purchaser 
pays in full before maturity.l0 
The plaintiff, a small loan company (which is not a bank within the 
meaning of General Laws, Chapter 167), also contended that the li-
censing provisions of the act were unconstitutionally discriminatory, 
inasmuch as those provisions are not applicable to such banks as en-
gage in the business of buying installment contracts from motor ve-
hicle dealers. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected this contention. 
The statutory standard of eligibility for a license as a sales finance 
company is that the applicant have such financial responsibility, 
character, reputation, integrity, and general fitness as to command the 
confidence of the public and to warrant the belief that the business 
will be operated lawfully, honestly, and fairly.11 General provision for 
such characteristics in exempt state and national banks is made in the 
statutes by which those institutions are subjected to regulatory con-
trol.12 The general regulation of small loans companies, on the other 
hand, is less comprehensive.18 Hence, ruled the Court, there is a "ra-
tional basis for distinguishing between banks and small loans licensees 
as to their presumptive fitness to operate as motor vehicle sales finance 
companies." The classification being rational and not invidious, the 
statutory scheme cannot be said to be unlawfully discriminatory. 
The fourth equal protection case may be comprehensible only to 
persons steeped in Massachusetts legislative practice. Begley v. Board 
of Appeal of Boston14 involved the provision of the Boston Zoning 
Act15 to the effect that one seeking review in the Superior Court of a 
8 Pioneer Credit Corp. v. Commissioner of Banks, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 789, 207 
N.E.2d 51, also noted in §§3.4, 7.2 supra. 
9 G.L., c. 255B, inserted by Acts of 1958, c. 674, §l. 
10 The decision on this point is discussed at §11.4 supra. 
11 G.L., c. 255B, §2. 
12 Id., c. 167; 12 u.s.c. §§21-215b (1964). 
18 G.L., c. 140, §§96-111l. Although Section 96 empowers the Commissioner to 
"establish regulations respecting the granting of licenses and the business carried 
on by the licensees," this does not appear to have been construed as carrying super-
vision beyond the point necessary for effectuation of the main purpose of the 
statute, regulation of interest charges. 
14 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1091, 208 N.E.2d 799, also noted in §14.11 infra. 
15 Acts of 1924, c. 488, §19. The bond provision was inserted by Acts of 1941, 
c. 11711, §18. 
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decision of the Boston Board of Appeal must file a bond to indemnify 
the person in whose favor the decision was rendered from damages 
and costs in case the decision of the Board is affirmed. There is no 
comparable provision in the general Zoning Enabling Act,16 which is 
applicable to all cities, except Boston, and all towns. A person claim-
ing to be aggrieved by a decision of the Boston Board of Appeal filed 
an appeal in the Superior Court, where he was ordered to post a bond 
in the sum of $15,000. Upon his failure to post the bond his bill was 
dismissed, and he appealed, on the ground'that the requirement of a 
bond in only Boston zoning appeal cases constituted a denial of equal 
protection of the laws. The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the con-
tention and affirmed the decree of dismissal. 
The Court argued that the legislature could have determined that 
the relatively large population of Boston involved a possibility of an 
unduly large number of frivolous or vexatious zoning appeals in Suf-
folk County, as compared with the possibilities in other counties, and 
that this localized danger of undue strain on the resources of the Su-
perior Court would be reduced by the bond requirement. This ration-
alization of the result is not too convincing. As Justice Whittemore 
pointed out in dissent,17 the Court's argument might well justify the 
costs aspect of the bond, but it is questionable if it explains the dam-
ages aspect. 
A more satisfactory ground of decision might have been the histor-
ical one, that the over-all pattern of the General Laws has for many 
years reflected a legislative judgment that, in numerous respects, con-
ditions in Boston are so different from those in other communities as 
to call for separate legislative treatment in those respects. For this rea-
son, many provisions of the General Laws are expressly made inappli-
cable to Boston, and the resulting classifications do not appear to have 
been questioned before the courts. An advisory opinion,18 cited with 
approval in the present case,19 sustained the dichotomy insofar as ur-
ban renewal was concerned. It would seem that a court need not be 
overscrutinous of a legislative judgment, in effect since 1924, that Bos-
ton needs a system of zoning regulation radically different from that 
which prevails in the rest of the state. 
§11.11. Miscellaneous decisions. An advisory opinion1 given dur-
ing the 1965 SURVEY year drew attention to a gambit of political 
gamesmanship which may sometimes be used to evade the spirit of the 
constitutional provision2 which prohibits the appointment, during the 
term for which he was elected, of a legislator to an office whose emolu-
ments have been increased during such term. The applicability of the 
16 G.L., c. 40A. 
17 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1091, 1093, 208 N.E.2d 799, 801. 
18 Opinion of the Justices, 341 Mass. 760, 168 N.E.2d 858 (1960), noted in 1960 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§10.2, 13.8. 
191965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1091, 1092-1093, 208 N.E.2d 799, 801. 
§11.l1. 1 Opinion of the Justices, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1201, 202 N.E.2d 234. 
2 Mass. Const., Amend. Art. LXV. 
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provision depends upon whether the salary (or other emolument) of 
the appointee'S predecessor was fixed by law as the salary of the office, 
or the salary of the incumbent of the office. In the former case, a salary 
increase after the opening of a legislative term renders members of 
the legislature ineligible for appointment to the office during that 
term. If, however, the salary has been fixed for an incumbent of the 
office, a legislator may be appointed to fill a vacancy, and a salary 
established for him. 
During the 1963-1965 legislative term, the salary of the Registrar of 
Motor Vehicles was raised, on December 4, 1963, from $12,500 to 
$16,000. In October, 1964, the office of Registrar being then vacant, 
the Governor appointed an incumbent member of the legislature to 
the office, and by vote of the Governor and Council his salary was set 
at $12,500. The Justices ruled that the appointment came within the 
constitutional prohibition, since the salary, prior to the appointment, 
was keyed to the office, not to the incumbent. It was completely irrel-
evant that, after the appointment, the salary was keyed to the incum-
bent and reverted to the level of the office salary prior to the 1963 
increase. 
Some of the folklore with respect to the legal effect of a pardon was 
dissipated in Commissioner of the Metropolitan District Commission 
v. Director of Civil Service.s The Supreme Judicial Court there held 
that, contrary to some popular belief, a pardon does not completely 
obliterate all trace of criminality. 
A person who had been convicted (upon a plea of guilty) of armed 
robbery, and who had later received a pardon, applied for appoint-
ment to the Commission's police force. The Commissioner refused to 
appoint him on the basis of a statute4 which makes a person convicted 
of a felony ineligible for appointment as a police officer. Since the ap-
plicant was a disabled veteran, the Director of Civil Service took the 
position that his appointment was mandatory under the Veterans' 
Preference Act.1I 
The Court rejected the Director's contention, reaffirming the prin-
ciple stated in an earlier case6 that a statute conferring an absolute 
preferential right of employment to veterans would be of doubtful 
conformity with the provisions of Articles 6 and 7 of the Declaration 
of Rights. In order to resolve constitutional doubts, the statute was 
construed as giving the appointing authority power to refuse to hire 
a veteran when there are reasonable grounds to regard the veteran's 
character as rendering him unfit or unsuitable to perform the duties 
of the appointive office. 
On the other hand, the Court did not agree that the statute upon 
which the Commissioner relied justified the nonappointment of the 
applicant. A blanket disqualification for employment in consequence 
81964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1345, 203 N.E.2d 95, also noted in §12.9 infra. 
4 G.L., c. 41, §96A. 
II Id., c. 31, §23. 
6 Brown v. Russell, 166 Mass. 14,43 N.E. 1005 (1896). 
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of conviction of felony is by way of punishment for the felony, and to 
impose such punishment upon a pardoned felon would be in deroga-
tion of the pardoning power. The Court went on, however, to rule 
that the appointing authority, in making evaluation of the applicant's 
character qualifications for the position, may take into account the 
facts related to the pardoned conviction, and may also "give weight" 
to the general policy expressed in the statutory blanket disqualifica-
tion of convicted felons for employment as policemen. 
In another case the Court showed a refreshing disinclination to 
allow shibboleths, formulated out of whole cloth in days when govern-
ment was simple and its problems few, to thwart intelligent solution 
of public problems. One sterile legalism of long standing is to the 
effect that legislative power cannot be delegated. This proposition, 
deriving from the mistaken observations of Montesquieu that govern-
ment is divided into three parts, legislative, executive, and judicial, 
which must operate in watertight compartments, was seemingly per-
petuated by Article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. But 
the fact of the matter is that legislatures have always delegated powers 
to lesser agencies. At first judges blinded themselves to this fact, but 
sustained delegations by calling them something else.7 As government 
became more complex, and the fact of delegation could no longer be 
gainsaid, the form of the old doctrine was sought to be salvaged when 
judges said that delegation is permissible when the legislature estab-
lishes "standards" by which the subordinate agency is to be bound in 
carrying the legislation into execution.s 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority v. Boston Safe Deposit 
& Trust Co.9 grew out of a 1964 statute10 which created the Authority 
and gave it a mandate to provide mass transportation facilities by own-
ing and operating such facilities and by contracting with, subsidizing, 
and leasing facilities to private transportation companies. It has bor-
rowing power, and it co-ordinates contributions to deficits by the Com-
monwealth and various cities and towns in the greater Boston area. 
One of the principal issues in the litigation between the Authority and 
various banks which had agreed to lend it money was whether delega-
tion of powers to the Authority was bad for want of statutory "stan-
dards." Although the enabling act contained only the most generalized 
directions as to how the Authority was to perform its functions, the 
delegation was sustained. It was sufficient that the legislature broadly 
described its policy of having provided mass transportation in the in-
terest of promoting the general economic and social well-being. The 
composition of the Authority, the presence of an advisory board of 
local officials with some budget control, the requirement of consulta-
7 It was fashionable to speak of "contingent" legislation. See Field v. Clark, 14S 
U.S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, S6 L. Ed. 294 (1892). And see the involved formula set 
forth in Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491, 498 (187S). 
8 Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct. S56, 48 L. Ed. M6 (1904). 
9 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 297, 205 N.E.2d M6. 
10 G.L., c. 161A, inserted by Acts of 1964, c. 56S, §18. 
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tion with various public agencies, the necessity of annual reports, and 
like matters gave sufficient assurance that the operations of the Au-
thority would be within the bounds of legislative policy. The Court 
also resolved other constitutional issues dealing with limitations upon 
borrowing and pledging the credit of the Commonwealth. 
In an advisory opinion11 the Justices indicated that the "one-man, 
one-vote" principle applied by the Supreme Court of the United 
States12 to elections to state legislatures is equally applicable to mu-
nicipal elections. In the city of Peabody the voter population of the 
seven wards into which the city was divided ranged from a low of 5.9 
per cent of the total in one ward to a high of 22.8 per cent in another. 
The city council had failed to redivide the city into wards, and a local 
option bill was proposed which would reconstitute the city into six 
wards, each with a voter population of from 14.7 per cent to 18.7 per 
cent of the total. The primary question put to the Justices focused 
upon the option the bill would give to the city voters to accept or 
reject it. The Justices found no constitutional objection to this phase 
of the proposal, but they volunteered the suggestion that, if the voters 
should reject the proposal, the existing inequalities of voting power 
among the inhabitants of the different wards would raise a serious 
question under the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause. 
The timing of a claim of constitutional right is often of crucial im-
portance. If it is asserted prematurely, it may not be considered. This 
was the situation in Electronics Corporation of America v. City Coun-
cil of Cambridge.1s There the city government and the local redevelop-
ment authority were looking into the matter of making a sector of the 
city an urban renewal area, with a view to having it acquired as a site 
for operations by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 
Landowners in the sector, unwilling to have their property taken, 
sought injunctive relief, alleging that taking of their property would 
be ultra vires the redevelopment authority, and would also constitute 
a taking without due process of law. A demurrer to the bill was sus-
tained, since it was not made to appear that the authority had gone 
through the administrative steps requisite to establishment of a re-
newal area, and since the statute provides a judicial remedy for an 
aggrieved party subsequent to such administrative action. 
On the other hand, the claim can be asserted too late. Thus, in 
Commonwealth v. Fancy,14 it was contended, on appeal from a crim-
inal conviction, that pretrial police examination of the accused made 
statements obtained from him inadmissible at the trial, under the doc-
trine of Escobedo v. Illinois.15 The contention was summarily rejected, 
since the precise point was not made at the trial, and the record was 
insufficient to support it. 
11 Opinion of the Justices, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 807, 207 N.E.2d 264. 
12 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 u.S. 533, 84 Sup. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964). 
IS 1965 ;Mass. Adv. Sh. 323, 204 N.E.2d 707, also noted in §§13.2, 14.31 infra. 
141965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 771, 207 N.E.2d 276. See §11.5 sUfrra. 
15378 U.S. 478, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964). See §1l.4 sUfrra. 
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The requirements of timing are not, however, formulated in a doc-
trinaire way. Commonwealth v. Guerro16 was a case tried before the 
Escobedo case was decided. Damaging statements made by the defen-
dant during police interrogation after he had been refused permission 
to call his lawyer were admitted in evidence, and there was no objec-
tion on constitutional grounds. On the appeal, heard after the Esco-
bedo decision, the constitutional argument was considered and sus-
tained, even though trial counsel had not "optimistically anticipated" 
the ruling in Escobedo.17 
There can be contexts, too, in which failure to raise the claim of 
constitutional right will not be fatal. Thus, in a case finally decided 
ten years before the Supreme Court of the United States decided, in 
Gideon v. Wainwright,18 that a defendant who cannot afford counsel 
of his own must be given recourse to counsel, such a defendant was 
convicted without having had the assistance of an attorney. He did 
not ask the trial judge for a lawyer, although it should have been 
apparent to the court that he was indigent. In Subilosky v. Common-
wealth,19 on writ of error, the Court vacated the conviction. Here, the 
nature of the invasion of constitutional right, although it was not 
known to be such until Gideon, was such as to make the trial lacking 
in the fundamental fairness which is essential to support a conviction. 
Just which constitutional rights are so basic that their violation, be-
fore they are authoritatively known to be constitutionally protected, 
can be judicially redressed, is an extremely subtle question. We learned, 
during the 1965 SURVEY year, that the rule of Mapp v. Ohio,20 exclud-
ing the fruits of illegal searches and seizures from evidence in state 
courts, is not retroactively applicable for collateral attack upon con-
victions which became final prior to the date of that decision.21 Fed-
eral district courts have held,22 upon this authority, that the Escobedo 
doctrine is not available to empty the prisons of all persons who were, 
prior to conviction, interrogated by police in violation of their rights 
to consult with counsel. Whether Massachusetts would limit the 
Guerro doctrine to cases of direct appeal from a pre-Escobedo convic-
161965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 869,207 N.E.2d 887, also noted in §11.4 supra, §12.3 infra. 
17 In Dirring, Petitioner, 344 Mass. 522, 524, 183 N.E.2d 300, 301 (1962), the Court 
refused to make a retroactive application of the doctrine of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 u.S. 
643, 81 Sup. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961), partly because Dirring, unlike the 
defendant in Commonwealth v. Spofford, 343 Mass. 703, 180 N.E.2d 673 (1962), had 
not claimed the benefit of the doctrine at his trial in "optimistic anticipation" of 
the announcement of the doctrine by the Supreme Court. See 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §§10.2, 11.7, 21.6. 
18 372 U.S. 335, 83 Sup. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963). 
19 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1121, 209 N.E.2d 316. 
20367 U.S. 643, 81 Sup. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). 
21 Ange1et v. Fay, 381 U.S. 654, 85 Sup. Ct. 1750, 14 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1965); Linkletter 
v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,85 Sup. Ct. 1731, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1965). 
22 Carrizosa v. Wilson, 244 F. Supp. 120 (N.D. Calif. 1965); Meyer v. Klinger, 243 
F. Supp. 788 (S.D. Calif. 1965). The First Circuit has pointedly declined to commit 
itself as to the retroactive applicability of Escobedo. Kerrigan v. Scafati, 348 F.2d 
187, 189n. (1st Cir. 1965). 
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tion remains to be seen. There might seem to be a very slim distinc-
tion between the right to a lawyer in the police station and the right 
to a lawyer in the courtroom. 
Mention should also be made of a case which, because of its over-
tones, may portend development of future constitutional doctrine. 
Gardner v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority28 was a proceeding for 
enforcement of subpoenas to various persons to testify before the Crime 
Commission. The sole objection to the giving of testimony was based 
on the presence of but one of the seven members of the Commission 
at the hearing. The Court sustained the validity of the procedure as 
being authorized by the enabling resolve and the rules of the Com-
mission. The Court went on, however, to emphasize the required pri-
vacy and secrecy of Commission hearings,24 and to point out that these 
protect the individual witness from "being publicly or privately pil-
loried by a single member who lacks the power of self-restraint or 
spurns its exercise." Whether this implies that rights so protected are 
of constitutional dimension which would be judicially enforced in an-
other context remains to be seen. Some Justices of the Supreme Court 
of the United States have intimated an affirmative answer in the con-
text of some public legislative committee hearings.25 
Whether a defendant in a criminal case has a pretrial right of dis-
covery was a question some aspects of which were presented in three 
cases decided during the 1965 SURVEY year. In Commonwealth v. Kier-
nan,26 motions presented before and during trial asserted that the po-
lice had, without right,. taken unspecified papers and records from the 
possession of the defendant. The motions asked for suppression of 
such materials, and of information obtained by the prosecution in 
consequence of the seizure. The Court sustained denial of the motions, 
ruling that the moving party must identify the evidence sought to be 
suppressed. In a second case,27 where the trial judge had permitted the 
defense to question the prosecution witnesses for the purpose of iden-
tifying proposed prosecution exhibits and subsequently moving that 
such exhibits be suppressed, the Court expressly disapproved the prac-
tice. 
In another case,28 however, where prospective prosecution witnesses 
were being held in custody pending the trial, it was held that the pros-
ecutor had no right to prevent their being made available for inter-
281965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 289, 204 N.E.2d 887. 
24 Resolves of 1962, c. 146, par. 5. 
25 See dissenting opinions in Braden v. United States, S65 U.S. 4SI, 81 Sup. Ct. 
584, 5 L. Ed. 2d 65S (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, S65 U.S. S99, 81 Sup. Ct. 
567, 5 L. Ed. 2d 6SS (1961); Barenb1att v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 79 Sup. Ct. 1081, 
S L. Ed. 2d 1115 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, S60 U.S. 72,79 Sup. Ct. 1040, S L. Ed. 
2d 1090 (1959). Cf. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, S72 U.S. 
5S9, 8S Sup. Ct. 889, 9 L. Ed. 2d 929 (196S). 
261964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1155,201 N.E.2d 504, also noted in §§12.4, 12.6, 12.7 infra. 
27 Commonwealth v. Roy, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 799, 207 N.E.2d 284, also noted in 
§11.5 supra, §§12.2, 12.S, 12.6 infra. 
28 Commonwealth v. Balliro, 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1145, 209 N.E.2d S08, also noted 
in §§12.6, 12.8 infra. 
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views by defense counsel. While a defendant has no right to obtain 
pretrial statements from unwilling witnesses, he does have a right not 
to be barred, by the prosecutor, from access to such witnesses. 
Commonwealth v. McGrath29 involved the right of speedy trial in 
a criminal case in unusual circumstances. Before the defendant's in-
dictment in the Superior Court, he had been convicted in a United 
States court and sentenced to prison for twenty-two years. The State 
placed detainer warrants against him, looking to his trial upon com-
pletion of his federal term. Upon the defendant's motion to dismiss 
the indictment for want of prosecution, it was made to appear that 
the federal authorities were willing to make him available for trial in 
the state court, provided that the Government should be reimbursed 
Hfor the associated costs." (These would have included the cost of 
transportation between Atlanta, Georgia, where the defendant was 
incarcerated, and Boston.) The district attorney of Suffolk County de-
clined to pay such costs. The Court ruled that failure of the district 
attorney to take advantage of the Government's willingness to make 
the defendant available for trial would constitute invasion of the 
latter's right to a speedy trial. The defendant would be entitled to 
the dismissal if the district attorney did not, within a reasonable time, 
take appropriate steps to bring him to trial in the state court. 
The perennial problemso of what to do about prejudicial pretrial 
publicity in advance of the trial of a criminal case was considered in 
an advisory opinion.81 The House had before it a proposal to visit 
criminal sanctions upon the divulging or publishing of information 
prejudicial to a defendant's right to fair and impartial trial by jury 
in a criminal proceeding. The Justices, pointing out that the course 
of decision in the Supreme Court of the United States to date pre-
cludes the giving of categorical answers with respect to real or seeming 
conflicts between constitutional freedom of expression and constitu-
tional right to impartial trial, took occasion to point out some of the 
problems of legislative draftsmanship involved in writing legislation 
in this area. Care must be taken, they pointed out, to avoid in many 
respects the defect of vagueness in defining the scope of such prohibi-
tions as are written into a statute. Also, in choosing the criminal law 
as a vehicle for effectuating policy in this context, it is important, on 
the one hand, to look to the individual's right to jury trial and, on 
the other, to avoid undue restriction upon the contempt powers of 
the courts. The bill under consideration was ultimately killed in the 
legislature, but the advisory opinion provides indispensable guidelines 
for those who attempt to construct legislation in this area. 
29 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 535, 205 N.E.2d 710, also noted in §12.4 infra, which also 
discusses Commonwealth v. Chase, 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1187,201 N.E.2d 829, another 
speedy trial case. 
80 Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 70 Sup. Ct. 252, 94 L. Ed. 562 
(1950) (separate opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter). 
811965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 973, 208 N.E.2d 240. 
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